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FORFEITURE, LEGITIMATION AND A DUE
PROCESS RIGHT TO COUNSEL
William J. Genego
INTRODUCTION
Why is a lawyer from California writing a law review
article about the civil forfeiture decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit? The answer stems
from my participation as a law student in a clinical program
that litigated a fair amount of cases before the Second Circuit,
as well as before district courts under its jurisdiction. I was
even permitted to argue before the Second Circuit as a stu-
dent, as were a number of other students in the program. Most
of the clinical program's cases concerned federal sentencing
and parole, subjects about which there was little case law at
that time. We observed first-hand the Second Circuit making
new law as it mapped out constitutional and statutory bound-
aries in federal sentencing and parole. Learning from the ex-
ample set by my instructors, I began following the court's deci-
sions carefully to learn how each of the judges ruled in specific
cases and on particular issues. Through that clinical experi-
ence, I came to believe the common wisdom that the Second
Circuit was the first among equals, the second most important
court in the country, save only the Supreme Court. The quality
of the Second Circuit's opinions and the judges who wrote
them confirmed that common wisdom, as did the court's role of
frequently establishing new precedent that was later followed
by federal courts in other circuits.
Long after I moved elsewhere to teach and practice, my
interest in the court continued. Thus, even though I am no
longer paid for writing law review articles, I welcomed the
opportunity to examine the Second Circuit's recent civil forfei-
* B.S., New York University, 1972; J.D., Yale Law School, 1975; LL.M.,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1977.
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ture decisions. Through those decisions, the court has exhibited
the independence in its rulings, the clarity of thought in its
opinions and the commitment to the fairness of the legal pro-
cess in its outcomes that have historically marked it as a spe-
cial court.
Perhaps most remarkable about the court's recent forfei-
ture decisions is how much they have changed from prior
years. In 1991, a Second Circuit judge observed that "[t]he
Second Circuit, at least for now, remains unable to avoid the
inevitably unjust results [of civil forfeiture]."' While that ob-
servation accurately described the court's past forfeiture deci-
sions-which for the most part consisted of routine affirmances
of government forfeitures, no matter how innocent the owner
or how egregious the government conduct-it did not accurate-
ly predict the court's future forfeiture decisions. Within a
twelve-month period beginning in early 1992, the Second Cir-
cuit issued no less than five decisions favorable to civil forfei-
ture claimants. Two of these decisions established important
new constitutional protections,2 while the other three narrowly
interpreted and applied forfeiture statutes in a manner that
not only favored the claimants in those particular cases, but
will similarly benefit future civil forfeiture claimants.3
The change was reflected not just in the court's holdings,
1 George C. Pratt & William B. Petersen, Civil Forfeiture in the Second Cir-
cuit, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 653, 671 (1991).
2 United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 904-
05 (2d Cir. 1992) (ex parte, pre-notice seizure of property violated due process);
United States v. 38 Whaler's Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.) (Eighth Amend-
ment cruel and unusual punishment provision may apply to civil forfeiture)cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992); see infra at notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
The United States Supreme Court confirmed the Second Circuit's influential
role in the development of the law when it subsequently addressed these issues to
resolve conflicts among the circuit courts and, in each instance, sided with the
position taken by the Second Circuit. See United States v. Good, No. 92-1180,
1993 WL 505539, at *6-11 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1993) (ex parte, pre-notice seizure of real
property violates due process unless the government demonstrates the existence of
exigent circumstances); United States v. Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (agreeing
with position of Second Circuit that Eighth Amendment applies to civil forfeitures,
but holding that excessive fines provision, rather than cruel and unusual punish-
ment provision, applies).
' United States v. $31,990 in United States Currency, 982 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.
1993); Onwubiko v. United States, 969 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
One 1987 Jeep Wrangler Automobile, 972 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1992); see infra notes
66-82 and accompanying text.
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but also in the dicta of its opinions. For example, in 1989 the
court expressed no reluctance in upholding the summary judg-
ment forfeiture of an entire 120 acre farm, including the house,
barn and several other buildings because cocaine had been sold
from the house. While the result might have seemed "harsh,"
the court commented that there was no doubt Congress intend-
ed such a result "in view of the magnitude of the national drug
problem it was addressing."4 But by 1992, the court expressed
concern on at least three occasions about the government's
possible misuse of its forfeiture power, letting it be known that
the "war on drugs" would no longer be accepted as a justifica-
tion for broadly interpreting the government's forfeiture power.
As the court stated in one of its 1992 opinions, "we do not
believe that a disproportionately large forfeiture can be reason-
ably justified as a civil fine as opposed to punishment by plac-
ing full responsibility for the 'war on drugs' on the shoulders of
every individual claimant."5 After years of routinely rubber
stamping the government's exercise of its forfeiture powers, the
Second Circuit appears to have adopted an approach that scru-
tinizes and questions the government's forfeiture power in
nearly every respect.
This Article considers the Second Circuit's recent forfeiture
decisions collectively, and attempts to find an explanation for
the court's sudden shift. It suggests that the explanation lies in
a theory of judicial decisionmaking that is based on the concept
of legitimation. The changes in the court's forfeiture decisions
reflect the court's need to legitimize its existence as an inde-
pendent branch of government, and thereby affirm and main-
tain its power. Whether such decisions should be criticized or
respected depends on whether a court is committed to seeing
that the rights declared are respected.6 In the context of the
United States v. 4492 Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1271 (2d Cir. 1989).
38 Whaler's Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 37.
One might view decisions motivated by a court's concern for its own legiti-
macy with cynicism because they seem to be more concerned with affirming the
court's power than with ensuring that the rights declared are secured. Decisions
motivated by legitimation, however, are not necessarily subject to criticism. Even if
motivated by a court's concern for its legitimacy, such decisions nevertheless may
have the effect of advancing the law in a meaningful way. Why a court might
reach a particular outcome or issue a particular decision that advances the law




Second Circuit's recent forfeiture decisions, that commitment
requires the court to recognize that in some circumstances, if
civil forfeiture claimants are otherwise unable to afford repre-
sentation, they must be provided with counsel. Recognizing
that such claimants must be offered a right to counsel in cer-
tain circumstances is consistent with the path the Second
Circuit has blazed in its recent forfeiture decisions. Taking the
additional step of explicitly recognizing a right to counsel
would further secure the Second Circuit's tradition of being
first among equals.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the history of
forfeiture precedent generally and explains how the federal
courts and, particularly, the Second Circuit virtually rubber
stamped the government's exercise of its forfeiture power, even
as those powers were greatly expanded in the 1980s. Part II
identifies a sudden change in the Second Circuit's forfeiture
decisions, and discusses five Second Circuit decisions issued in
1992 and early 1993 which favored claimants and provided
them generally with important new rights. Part III next sug-
gests that the sudden shift is explained by the court's need to
legitimize its role and affirm its power. Finally, Part IV argues
that for the court to make legitimation a meaningful concept, it
should take the additional step of recognizing that claimants
have a right to be assisted by counsel. Specifically, Part IV
explains why and how the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment can be read to provide for a right to counsel for
claimants in civil forfeiture proceedings.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO FORFEITURE
A. The Precedent Established
The legal fiction on which civil forfeiture is based has
never really fooled anyone. Judges sitting one hundred years
ago were just as capable as judges are today of recognizing the
potential oxymoron of "civil forfeiture."' The legal fiction was
' See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). An 1874 act authorized
a court to order production of invoices, books and other private documents in in
rem proceedings for forfeiture of goods alleged to have been fraudulently imported
without being assessed applicable custom's duties. The Court recognized that the
[Vol. 59: 337
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that inanimate property could be guilty of wrongdoing. This
allowed the property to be named as a party to a lawsuit,
which, in turn, meant that the case was a civil proceeding.'
Because forfeiture was a civil proceeding, the protections re-
quired in criminal cases, where the government seeks to pun-
ish a person for wrongdoing, were not required. Judicial ac-
ceptance of the legal fiction, however, did not change the fact
that a civil forfeiture of property punished its owner, at least
as the term "punish" is commonly understood.9 Indeed, from
action, though technically a civil proceeding, was in substance and effect a crimi-
nal one. Suits for penalties and forfeitures are of a "quasi-criminal" nature. To
require a party to produce his private books to establish a breach of law-a predi-
cate to establishing a right to forfeiture-is actually compelling him to furnish evi-
dence against himself. Thus, although the proceeding is in rem, the owner of the
goods that are sought to be forfeited is actually a substantial party to the suit
and, therefore, should be entitled to all the privileges that apply to a person
against whom forfeiture of property is sought based on the commission of a crimi-
nal offense. Id. at 634-38.
8 A judicial forfeiture action is initiated by the filing of a certified complaint
by the government pursuant to Rule C of the Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims. SUPP. A.M.C. R. C. If initial review of the com-
plaint by the court indicates that the requirements for an in rem action exist, the
court will direct the clerk to issue a warrant for the arrest of the property. An
authorized person then serves process on the res in accordance with Supplemental
Rule E(4). Given the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Good,
No. 92-1180, 1993 WL 505539 (U.S. Dec. 13 1993), if the res is real property, the
government will be required to give notice prior to executing the warrant of arrest
and seizing the res. Even without the filing of a complaint for forfeiture, the gov-
ernment may seek to seize property that it intends to attempt to forfeit without
prior notice or hearing by two other methods: (1) pursuant to the Customs Laws,
which authorizes the attorney general to seize property without notice when he or
she has probable cause to do so; and (2) where an ex parte probable cause deter-
mination is made by a magistrate or a judge who issues a seizure warrant pursu-
ant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is often the case, especially
when the res is not real property, that the property sought to be forfeited will
already be in the custody of the government due to a seizure associated with a
law enforcement investigation. Once the forfeiture complaint is filed, a claim must
be filed within ten days after execution of process pursuant to Supplemental Rule
C(6), or within such additional time as the court may permit. Supplemental Rule
C also requires that an answer to the complaint must be served within 20 days
after the filing of the claim. SUPP. A.M.C. R. C(6).
' What constitutes punishment under current legal analysis, however, is deter-
mined not by what the person subject to the official action experiences, but ordi-
narily by what the official taking the action intends. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to
determine eligibility to remain in the country. The immigration judge's sole power
is to order deportation, based not on punishment for any crime related to illegal
presence in the country, but on a continuing violation of the immigration laws.
There are circumstances where a sanction, although nominally civil, may constitute
1993]
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the first use of civil forfeiture laws in the United States, courts
have recognized the unfair results they could cause."°
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts consistently upheld the validity of forfeiture statutes
against legal challenges. The Supreme Court had no trouble
adopting the "guilty property" fiction of common law England
as the basis for rejecting procedural and substantive challenges
to civil forfeiture." After embracing this legal fiction, the
Court rejected subsequent challenges by relying on its own
precedent. 2 Moreover, repeated efforts of property owners to
assert innocence as a defense to forfeiture of their property
were rejected just as frequently. 3 Eventually, the Court came
to dismiss such challenges out of hand and refused to consider
fully arguments that forfeiture was unconstitutional because
such challenges had been rejected repeatedly on so many previ-
ous occasions. Thus, in rejecting a challenge to civil forfeiture,
Justice McKenna in 1921 explained that the "guilty property"
fiction upon which civil forfeiture rested was "too firmly fixed
in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to
now be displaced." 4
The Second Circuit's early forfeiture decisions similarly
punishment. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (civil penalty of
$130,000 would constitute punishment if government's costs were only $16,000
because disparity is sufficient to make purpose of penalty punitive rather than
remedial). Prior to Halper, the Court had articulated a test which rested upon the
intent of the legislature as to whether a particular sanction was civil or criminal.
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (monetary penalty imposed by Federal
Water Pollution Control Act against operator of drilling facility for dispersion of oil
is civil penalty and not criminal punishment).
"0 See, e.g., United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233
(1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). In Brig Malek Adhel, the
Court upheld the forfeiture of a ship because it was used in "piratical conduct,"
even though it was "fully established" that the owner of the ship was not guilty of
any wrongdoing. See Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 238. Similarly, in The
Palmyra, the Court ruled that a ship could be forfeited because it was used in
"piratical conduct," even though there was no criminal conviction for the alleged
wrongdoing. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14-15.
1 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14-15.
12 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974)
(explaining that the "guilty property" rationale of The Palmyra was relied upon by
the Court in Brig Malek Adhel to reject the claimant's argument that forfeiture
was unconstitutional).
13 See, e.g., Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878).
14 See J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511
(1921).
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reflected acceptance and approval of the government's forfei-
ture power. As Judge Pratt has observed, "the Second Circuit[]
[exhibited a] passive and tolerant attitude toward civil forfei-
ture in the first half of the twentieth century." 5 The court
gave short shrift to claimants' arguments, even when the re-
sult seemed obviously unfair. For example, in denying a chal-
lenge to the forfeiture of diamonds belonging to a claimant who
had engaged in no wrongdoing, the court stated in 1918 that
"even if... innocent persons suffer great hardships" as a re-
sult of a forfeiture action, that is not grounds for voiding a
forfeiture judgment because "[tlhe purpose of Congress is per-
fectly clear and must be carried out.... . 16 Eventually, as did
the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit came to rely on the
entrenched nature of its own precedent as the reason for re-
jecting challenges to forfeiture. In explaining its rejection of a
challenge to a civil forfeiture in 1928, the court wrote that the
forfeiture provision in question had "been applied innumerable
times without question of its validity" and, for that reason,
there was "no ground to doubt its constitutionality.
")7
The courts' unwillingness even to address the merits of
new challenges claimants made to the forfeiture laws was
especially indefensible given the precedent upon which they
relied in refusing to do so. The earlier cases on which the
courts rested their summary rejection of claimants' arguments
had never satisfactorily answered the valid objections made to
the legal fiction on which forfeiture was based. Nevertheless,
claimants' arguments, for the most part, continued to fall on
deaf ears.
B. The Expansion of Forfeiture and the Judicial Response
After a flurry of forfeiture cases and decisions in the early
part of the century, the government's use of forfeiture appar-
ently decreased for a period of time, corresponding with the
end of prohibition. Before long, however, criminal activity
linked to illicit drugs lead to a new series of forfeiture actions.
15 Pratt & Petersen, supra note 1, at 662.
" In re Four Packages of Cut Diamonds, 255 F. 314, 317 (2d Cir. 1918), modi-
fied, 256 F.2d 305 (2d Cir 1919).
United States v. 416 Cases G.T. Whisky, 27 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
278 U.S. 627 (1928).
1993]
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Once again, the federal courts exhibited a "passive and toler-
ant" acceptance of the government's use of forfeiture. The Su-
preme Court reaffirmed its extreme deference to the
government's forfeiture power in its 1974 opinion in Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 8 a decision which guid-
ed and controlled federal courts' forfeiture decisions for nearly
two decades. The owner of the yacht in Pearson Yacht leased it
to two men. While the yacht was being used exclusively by the
lessees, a small amount of marijuana was found on board the
boat. It was undisputed that the owner of the yacht did not
know of the contraband. The government seized the yacht
pursuant to a statute which made property subject to forfeiture
if it was used to transport or to facilitate the transportation of
a controlled substance.19 A three-judge court, relying on the
Supreme Court's due process analysis in Fuentes v. Shevin, °
and its forfeiture decision in United States v. United States
Coin & Currency," ruled that the seizure and forfeiture vio-
lated the Constitution.22 The Supreme Court reversed, reject-
ing the argument that United States Coin & Currency had
overruled, sub silentio, its earlier forfeiture decisions.23 The
Court held that neither the seizure nor the forfeiture violated
the Constitution, even though the owner was innocent of any
wrongdoing. The decision in Pearson Yacht proved particu-
larly important because of the time it was decided.
In the early 1980s, when the government began what has
become its current war on drugs, civil forfeiture was intended
to be an important new weapon in the government's arsenal.
Thus, in 1984, Congress for the first time authorized the forfei-
ture of real property. As part of that same legislation, Con-
gress authorized the government to seize real property poten-
tially subject to forfeiture by obtaining an ex parte seizure war-
rant.26 Congress further expanded the scope of the forfeiture
18 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
19 Id. at 666.
20 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
21 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
363 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (D.P.R. 1973).
416 U.S. at 680.
24 Id. at 679-80, 686-91.
25 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
26 See id. § 881(b); 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(1) (1988).
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laws by enlarging the type of conduct that would provide a
basis for forfeiture, and by broadening the nature of the rela-
tionship between the property sought to be forfeited and the
underlying activity associated with it." Because of the Su-
preme Court's approval of the forfeiture in Pearson Yacht, the
federal courts, including the Second Circuit, consistently ap-
proved and upheld the government's use of civil forfeiture. As
Judge Pratt has noted, the "Second Circuit endorse[d] an ag-
gressive and zealous use of civil forfeiture."28 The court's en-
dorsement of civil forfeiture was reflected in rulings that inter-
preted forfeiture statutes so broadly as to enlarge the range of
property subject to forfeiture, and to make it easier for the
government to prevail in forfeiture actions.
For example, in 1986 the Second Circuit ruled that it was
permissible for the government to seize assets based on a for-
feiture complaint without making a showing of probable cause,
and that due process did not require a post-seizure probable
cause hearing." In that same case, the court ruled that to
seek forfeiture of money that is traceable to a violation of the
controlled substances act,3" the government did not need to
link the property to a particular illegal transaction. Converse-
ly, when interpreting a statutory defense to forfeiture, the
court did so narrowly. In United States v. 141st Street Corp.,
the court ruled that to qualify for the "lack of consent" defense
to forfeiture, a property owner-claimant had to establish that
he or she did all that reasonably could be expected to prevent
the illegal activity.32
The court expressed its approval of the government's ag-
gressive use of civil forfeiture in the war on drugs in dicta.
When confronted with a challenge to the forfeiture of a
Mercedes-Benz automobile because the remains of a marijuana
cigarette were found in the car, the court did not hesitate to
' Until 1984, statutes allowed forfeiture of property that was used to transport
a controlled substance or the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction. 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6) (1988). In 1984, property that was used to "facilitate" a violation of the
controlled substances act became subject to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988).
Pratt & Petersen, supra note 1, at 47-48.
29 United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1162-63 (2d Cir.
1986).
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).
31 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990).
32 Id. at 879-80.
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uphold the forfeiture, relying on its earlier precedent that "the
transportation of any quantity of drugs however minute is
admittedly sufficient to merit the forfeiture of the vehicle."33
Even more telling was the court's concluding paragraph in its
Livonia Road decision.34 The district court had granted sum-
mary judgment to the government, forfeiting a 120-acre parcel
of land with a house, two barns and several small buildings
under the theory that the defendant-property had "facilitated"
the distribution of cocaine, even though all of the activity relat-
ed to cocaine had occurred only at the house. The Second Cir-
cuit, in affirming the judgment of forfeiture, stated:
We are aware that the combined effect of the forfeiture statute and
the summary judgment procedures create an unusual, and perhaps
even harsh, result in this case. Nevertheless, this result fits square-
ly within the statutory framework for civil forfeitures that Congress
has expressly provided; we certainly cannot say that Congress did
not intend this result in view of the magnitude of the national drug
problem it was addressing."
The state of forfeiture law at the conclusion of the 1980s
in the Second Circuit and in the other circuits, was thus un-
mistakable. Following the lead provided by the Supreme Court
in Pearson Yacht, and endorsing Congress's adoption of forfei-
ture as the favorite new weapon in the war on drugs, the fed-
eral courts consistently ruled against the interests of claimants
and in favor of the government's broad use of forfeiture.
II. LEVELLING THE PLAYING FIELD FOR CLAIMANTS
Having been given the green light by the judiciary, Con-
gress continued to expand the scope of the forfeiture laws.
Thus, "money laundering"36 was added to the list of conduct
that can form the basis for forfeiture. Significantly, not only
are the "proceeds" of, or property used to "facilitate," money
laundering subject to forfeiture, but Congress also authorized
United States v. One Mercedes-Benz, 846 F.2d 2, 5 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curi-
am) (quoting United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado, 548 F.2d 421, 425 (2d
Cir. 1977)).
" United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989).
3" Id. at 1271.
" 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988).
'T See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1988).
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the forfeiture of property "involved in" money laundering."
Because nearly all crimes involving money will also commonly
constitute money laundering, the potential implications of this
particular expansion are enormous, given that any property
"involved" in money laundering can be forfeited. As the United
States Department of Justice has recognized, under the money
laundering forfeiture provisions, prosecutors have the ability to
seek forfeiture of property associated with conduct not other-
wise included within the forfeiture laws (e.g., mail fraud) by
characterizing such conduct as money laundering.39
For a period of time, forfeiture seemed immune from criti-
cism; after all, how could anyone argue that crime should pay?
The expansion of civil forfeiture and the government's aggres-
sive use of those laws, however, lead to criticism from some
observers who maintained that the civil forfeiture process was
so one-sided that it permitted government abuse and over-
reaching. One concern that has come to be widely shared by
forfeiture critics is the financial self-interest of law enforce-
ment in civil forfeiture. Under most forfeiture statutes, the
proceeds go to law enforcement, often-times to the specific
agency or organization responsible for the forfeiture. Therefore,
there is a direct, positive correlation between the property that
is forfeited and the amount of money available for the particu-
lar law enforcement agency. Critics suggest that the incentive
to make money may become more attractive than curbing or
solving crime, thereby skewing law enforcement's priorities
and its true mission.4 ° The corrupting influence of financial
gain was recognized by a federal district judge, who wrote that
he had been "misled particularly by the affidavits of the state
law enforcement officials whose agencies stand to gain finan-
cially as a result of the forfeiture."4' Notwithstanding such
38 Id.
3 Civil Forfeiture, Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) ch. 151, at 519 (Supp. Aug. 18,
1993).
"o See, e.g., Pratt & Petersen, supra note 1, at 85; Civil Forfeiture,supra note
39, ch. 151, at 552; Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Tainted Cash or Easy Money?,
ORLANDO SENT., June 14, 1992, at Al. The Sentinel conducted a study of the
Volusia County Florida Sheriffs Office, which revealed that the office had obtained
more than $3.5 million in forfeiture proceeds from seizures along Interstate 95.
Based on its study of the forfeiture practices of the Volusia County Sheriffs Office,
The Orlando Sentinel suggested that the Office had come to spend time looking
for drug money instead of fighting crime.
4 United States v. 110 Collier Drive, 793 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (N.D. Ala.
1993]
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expressions of concern, there seemed to be little reason to
think that judicial scrutiny of forfeiture was likely to change,
especially given the established precedent of years of prior
decisions and the acknowledged deference to the government's
forfeiture power that precedent embodied.42
Change did come, however, at least in the Second Circuit.
Compared to the usual pace of the common law, moreover, the
change was sudden and dramatic. In 1992 and early 1993, the
Second Circuit issued five decisions favorable to claimants. The
issues in these cases ranged from constitutional rulings of
broad effect to decisions based on statutory interpretation
which, while based on the facts of the particular case, still
provide important benefits to future civil forfeiture claim-
ants.43 Not only did the court's rulings favor claimants in a
number of important respects, but the court repeatedly ex-
pressed its concern about the government's potential abuse of
civil forfeiture. Another important message was communicated
by the court's opinions; the government could no longer expect
the court routinely to sanction use of the civil forfeiture laws
simply because those laws might be perceived as helpful to the
war on drugs.
For example, in one of its 1992 opinions, United States v.
All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc.44 ("Statewide"), the
Second Circuit considered an issue that it had addressed twice
before, once in 1989 and again in 1990-the pre-notice seizure
of real property by means of an ex parte warrant.45 In State-
wide, the government filed an in rem forfeiture complaint that
sought forfeiture of "all assets" of four corporations (including
1992).
42 Pratt & Petersen, supra note 1, at 671. Indeed, as noted above, in 1991
Judge Pratt commented that "[tihe Second Circuit, at least for now, remains un-
able to avoid the inevitably unjust results [of forfeiture proceedings]." Id.
' See United States v. $31,990 in United States Currency, 982 F.2d 851 (2d
Cir. 1993); United States v. One 1987 Jeep Wrangler Automobile, 972 F.2d 472
(2d Cir. 1992); United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d
896 (2d Cir. 1992); Onwubiko v. United States, 969 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. 38 Whaler's Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
44 971 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1992).
" The two earlier cases which had addressed this issue were United States v.
141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991)
and United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989), reh'g
denied, 897 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Statewide) and certain parcels of real property pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 981(a)(1)(A).46 According to the government's
theory, the in rem defendants had been involved in the opera-
tion of a stolen car business. At the same time the government
filed the forfeiture complaint, it submitted an ex parte applica-
tion for a warrant to seize the in rem defendants, which was
supported by an extensive declaration of a local (Nassau Coun-
ty) police detective detailing the "laundering" of stolen automo-
biles. After the seizure warrant was granted, the government
executed it without prior notice. The government "seized" the
property by sealing the premises, turning off the telephone
service and hanging "out of business" signs on the outside
doors. Statewide challenged the seizure and, when the district
court refused to vacate the seizure, it appealed. Rej ecting
the government's argument that it did not have jurisdiction,
the court ruled that the ex parte, pre-notice seizure violated
the property owners' due process rights." Employing the
three-part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge," the court
recognized the legitimacy of the government's asserted interest
in obtaining a pre-notice seizure and also acknowledged that
the private interest at stake, while considerable, was not as
great as it would have been had a home, as opposed to busi-
ness premises been seized.49 The court, however, nevertheless
found the seizure to be illegal, essentially because there were
no exigent circumstances which justified the government's com-
plete and continuing seizure of the premises." What is partic-
ularly notable about the court's ruling in Statewide is the
court's own recognition that: "The ex parte procedures used
here were virtually identical to those we permitted in [the
Court's two previous cases involving ex parte, pre-notice forfei-
ture seizures] 141st Street Corp., and Livonia."51 Moreover,
'G 971 F.2d at 898-99.
" Id. at 904-05.
45 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
4' Statewide, 971 F.2d at 902-03.
According to the Court, the government's legitimate interests could have
been satisfied by less-restrictive means, such as a "receivership, an occupancy
agreement, and lis pendes-invoked separately or together-[which] would have
served the government's interest more than adequately." Id. at 904-05.
"' Id. at 905; United States v. 141st St. Corp, 911 F.2d 870, 875 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd.,
889 F.2d 1258, 1260 (2d Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1990).
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those two earlier decisions involved property in which the
private interest at stake was greater-Livonia involved the ex
parte, pre-notice seizure of a home, and 141st Street Corp.
involved the ex parte, pre-notice seizure of an apartment build-
ing. To be sure, "the invasion of the property interest" in State-
wide was greater than in either Livonia or 141st Street. In
Livonia the government reached an occupancy agreement with
the claimant to remain in the house during the pendency of
the forfeiture proceedings, and in 141st Street the government
reached an agreement which permitted certain tenants to
remain in their apartments, whereas in Statewide the govern-
ment had seized an entire business, effectively shutting it
down completely. Even so, the different ruling in Statewide
cannot be explained satisfactorily based on the greater proper-
ty invasion. Although the greater invasion may have justified
finding that the subsequent continuing seizure of the property
was impermissible, the court ultimately allowed the govern-
ment to continue its seizure. The court ruled that what was
impermissible was not the continuing seizure, but the initial
seizure of the premises itself without notice. That result is
even more surprising inasmuch as Statewide only involved the
seizure of business premises, whereas both Livonia and 141st
Street Corp. involved the seizure of people's homes.
Not only had the Second Circuit ruled that the government
had acted illegally in executing the ex parte seizure in State-
wide, but it also expressed its concern over the government's
potential abuse of civil forfeiture: "[w]e continue to be enor-
mously troubled by the government's increasing and virtually
unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard
for the due process buried in those statutes." 2 This concern
was emphasized even by Judge Van Graafeiland, who dissent-
ed from the majority's holding that the seizure was unconstitu-
tional. He concluded his dissenting opinion by stating that he
"agree[d] wholeheartedly with the expression of concern con-
tained in the majority's" opinion.53
In another 1992 decision, United States v. 38 Whaler's
Cove Drive,54 the Second Circuit became the first federal court
52 971 F.2d at 905.
5'Id. at 910.
54 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
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of appeals to rule explicitly that the Eighth Amendment's cruel
and unusual punishment provision and the Fifth Amendment
Double Jeopardy Clause could apply to civil forfeitures.55 The
holding that the Eighth Amendment can apply to civil forfei-
tures is especially important, given that the "nexus" that must
be shown between the prohibited conduct and the property to
be forfeited has been expanded to include "facilitation" or "in-
volved in." As the statutory relationship between property and
conduct that must be shown becomes more tenuous, the more
likely it is that there will be disproportionate forfeitures, which
necessitates some limit on the property that may be subject to
forfeiture." That the Double Jeopardy Clause may apply to a
civil forfeiture proceeding is similarly important because it will
help prevent civil forfeiture from being used as a "dry run" for
a subsequent criminal prosecution. 7 Viewed in this light, the
court's holding might seem unsurprising rather than worthy of
special note. Prior to 1992, however, the court had been unwill-
ing to reach such a decision, as had every other circuit that
had occasion to address the question.55
As in Statewide, the Second Circuit's message was commu-
nicated through more than just its holding. The court let it be
known that the claimed importance of civil forfeiture to the
"war on drugs" would no longer be reason to allow the
government's forfeiture power to remain unchecked:
While we are extremely sympathetic to the need to address our
nation's serious narcotics problems, we do not believe that a
disproportionately large forfeiture can be reasonably justified as a
civil fine as opposed to punishment by placing full responsibility for
the "war on drugs" on the shoulders of every individual claimant.5
Id. at 35-37.
5 The Second Circuit's ruling as to the applicability of the Eighth Amendment
in Whaler's Cove has been modified by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). In Austin, the Supreme Court
held that the excessive fines provision of the Eighth Amendment ordinarily applies
to civil forfeitures, not the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
57 Statewide, 971 F.2d at 903.
" See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1990)
(citing United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 400-01 (3d
Cir. 1990)); United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 43-45 (1st Cir. 1989);
United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 232, 234-35 (9th Cir. 1988) (Eighth
Amendments protections do not apply in civil forfeiture).
" 954 F.2d at 37.
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The court made the same point in another 1992 decision,
United States v. Lasanta.6" In Lasanta, the government main-
tained that 21 U.S.C. section 881(b)(4), which provides that the
Attorney General may seize "[any property subject to forfei-
ture" without process when he or she "has probable cause to
believe that the property has been used or is intended to be
used in violation of this subchapter," creates an exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." Thus,
the government argued, the warrantless seizure and search of
the defendant's automobile in Lasanta did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the car was seized when there
was probable cause to believe it was subject to forfeiture and,
under those circumstances, section 881(b)(4) obviated the need
to obtain a warrant. Although the government's argument
might seem so untenable that rejecting it would hardly have
seemed significant,62 a number of other circuit courts had ac-
cepted the argument.63 The Second Circuit, however, flatly
rejected the government's argument. Moreover, in rejecting the
argument, the court again let it be known that the "war on
drugs" was not a talisman for ignoring the law: 'We find no
language in the fourth amendment suggesting that the right of
the people to be secure in their 'persons, houses, papers and
effects' applies to all searches and seizures except civil-forfei-
ture seizures in drug cases. " '
In two other 1992 forfeiture decisions, United States v.
$31,990 in United States Currency,6 and Onwubiko v. United
States,66 the Second Circuit issued rulings that narrowly in-
terpret and strictly apply particular forfeiture statutory provi-
sions. In $31,990 in United States Currency, the government
sought $31,990 in cash found in the trunk of a car whose driv-
'0 978 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1992).
61 Id. at 1304.
6 The government's argument appears strained for several reasons. First, the
Fourth Amendment, and not the statute, determines whether a warrant is re-
quired; second, the statute says nothing to suggest that it is attempting to obviate
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment; and third, even if Congress
did intend to supersede the warrant requirement by passage of the statute, it
could not do so without violating the Constitution. Id. at 1304-05.
Id. at 1304 (citations omitted).
64 Id. at 1305.
65 982 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1993).
66 969 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir. 1992).
[Vol. 59: 337
DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO COUNSEL
er was found in possession of one-half gram of cocaine. Relying
on 21 U.S.C. section 881(b)(4), the government argued that the
totality of the facts established probable cause to believe that
the cash was connected to the exchange of a controlled sub-
stance. The court rejected the government's argument on the
facts, and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the forfei-
ture action and its order returning the cash to the claimant.
The decision is significant beyond its factually based holding
for several reasons. First, the opinion demonstrates the court's
willingness to examine critically the government's factual as-
sertions to support forfeiture. Second, the court reaffirmed the
principle that the government was required to show a "sub-
stantial connection... between the money to be forfeited and
the exchange of a controlled substance."67 Third, the court
ruled that to obtain forfeiture, the government had to show
that the property it sought was connected to a particular ille-
gal transaction and not merely "related to some illegal activi-
ty."6" Further, the court once again concluded its opinion by
asserting that it was unwilling to allow the war on drugs to be
used as a justification for ignoring the rights of civil forfeiture
claimants: "While we recognize the formidable task faced by
the government in its war on drugs, we decline to condone the
abuse to civil forfeiture as a means of winning that war."69
Onwubiko similarly involved a decision that, while factual-
ly based, has implications for future civil forfeiture cases. Mr.
Onwubiko arrived in the United States with $2,438 in U.S.
currency on his person and "[seventy-two] heroin-filled balloons
in his digestive tract."" The government sought forfeiture of
the money based on the statutory provision that property used
to "facilitate" a drug offense is subject to forfeiture.7 The
facts on which the government relied to argue that the money
was used to "facilitate" the heroin offense were that "(1)
"7 982 F.2d at 854 (quoting United States v. $228,536 in Unites States Curren-
cy, 895 F.2d 908, 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 958 (1990)).
" Id. at 854. This particular ruling is in contrast to the court's 1986 decision
in United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986), where
the court ruled that a connection to a particular illegal transaction was not re-
quired. Id. at 1157-58.
982 F.2d at 856.
70 969 F.2d at 1393.
"1 Id. at 1399.
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Onwubiko was carrying the heroin, and (2) Onwubiko was
carrying the currency."72 The court ruled that these facts were
insufficient to satisfy even the government's "featherweight
initial showing that the currency was used to 'facilitate' the
drug offense."73 Moreover, the court went on to embrace fully
the requirement that the government was required to show a
"substantial connection" between the property to be forfeited
and the underlying criminal activity.74 This ruling was in con-
trast to the court's earlier rulings that to obtain forfeiture
under a "facilitation" theory, the government need only show a
"nexus" between the property and illegal activity.75 In addi-
tion to the significance of these legal principles, the opinion in
Onwubiko reveals a shift in the court's approach to forfeiture
cases for two additional reasons. First, the court ruled that Mr.
Onwubiko's inability to post a "cost bond" as required by stat-
ute could not be used, under the circumstances of the case, to
preclude him from contesting the forfeiture.76 Second, the
court ruled that on remand, the district court should appoint
counsel for Mr. Onwubiko.77
In still another 1992 forfeiture decision, United States v.
One 1987 Jeep Wrangler Automobile ("Jeep Wrangler"),7 the
Second Circuit exhibited a concern for claimants' rights not
found in earlier years. In Jeep Wrangler, the government
sought forfeiture of the defendant Jeep because the driver had
possessed twenty grams of marijuana. The Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") refused to consider the claimant's
request for administrative review of the forfeiture because, it
72 Id.
"' Id. The court ultimately remanded the case for a trial on Mr. Onwubiko's
claim, and noted that the government would have to present more than these
facts to meet its initial burden. Id. at 1400.
71 Id. at 1399-1400.
"' See, e.g., United States v. 38 Whaler's Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 29, 33 (2d
Cir. 1992) (government only need show a nexus, not a substantial connection,
between property and underlying criminal activity).
76 969 F.2d at 1399. The court referred to the government's argument that Mr.
Onwubiko was precluded from challenging the forfeiture because he failed to post
a cost bond as "Dickensian in its irony: The government took all of Onwubiko's
money, but thereafter conditioned his right to put the government to its burden of
proof on the payment of $250." Id.
" Id. at 1399 (citing Hodge v. Colon, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)); see 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
78 972 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1992).
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maintained, the claimant had failed to comply with the appli-
cable rules requiring a claimant to give notice of his or her
intent to contest the proposed forfeiture. The court first ruled
that while it is ordinarily without jurisdiction to review admin-
istrative forfeiture decisions, it had the power to do so here
because it was reviewing the DEA's refusal to exercise its ad-
ministrative jurisdiction. 9 Further, the court ruled that the
DEA's refusal to consider the claimant's challenge to its ad-
ministrative forfeiture action violated due process. °
Viewed collectively, these 1992 forfeiture decisions consti-
tute a remarkable change in the substantive content of the
Second Circuit's forfeiture law. The opinions also reflect a
marked change in the court's approach to reviewing civil forfei-
ture proceedings. These changes are even more noteworthy
because of the relatively short time span in which the change
occurred. Such a conclusion, however, is not intended to over-
state the contrast from previous years; not every forfeiture
decision in 1992 favored claimants, just as not all decisions in
prior years favored the government."1 Nevertheless these dif-
ferences do not undermine the essential point. 1992 was a
, Id. at 480.
Id. at 482. The due process ruling is likely to have less direct impact on
future forfeiture cases than the court's other 1992 decisions because the ruling
depended on the particular circumstances, which are not likely to re-occur. Never-
theless, the decision is still important in reviewing the court's recent forfeiture
decisions because it illustrates that the court is willing to police the civil forfeiture
process even in comparatively small or seemingly insignificant cases, which proba-
bly would not have received the court's attention in earlier years.
8 For example, in another 1992 decision, United States v. 755 Forest Rd., 985
F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1992), the Second Circuit affirmed a summary judgment forfeiture
of a claimant's home based on her husband's possession of narcotics and associated
paraphernalia. In affirming, the court illustrated the same mechanistic rejection of
the claimant's contentions typical of forfeiture decisions in earlier years. Judge
Van Graafeiland, who had dissented earlier in the year to the decision in United
States v. Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 906 (2d Cir. 1992), that the
pre-notice seizure violated due process, dissented in One Parcel and expressed the
view that "[t]his case is a glaring example of the Government's draconian use of
civil forfeiture." 985 F.2d at 73. Conversely, even before 1992, the Second Circuit
had issued opinions in civil forfeiture cases which exhibited concern for the rights
of claimants. See, e.g., United States v. 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1990) (claimant's flat denial of knowledge of underlying criminal activity may
be sufficient to defeat summary judgment); United States v. Property at 4492
Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1270 (2d Cir. 1989) (court expresses concern over fail-




watershed year for civil forfeiture claimants in the Second
Circuit, unlike any previous year in the history of the court.
The court's prior forfeiture decisions did not give reason to
expect such a change.
III. THE ROLE OF LEGITIMATION IN THE SUDDEN SHIFT
A. The Reason for the Sudden Shift
An obvious question is why? What might explain the
change in both the content and tone of the Second Circuit's
forfeiture opinions in such a short period of time? One answer
might be that Judge Pratt, who is particularly knowledgeable
about forfeiture law, 2 was on the panel and authored the
opinions in three of the cases." That suggestion, however,
does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question because
Judge Pratt was joined by other members of the court in each
of his opinions and had no control over the decisions in the
cases in which he did not sit.
Another possible answer might be changes in the war on
drugs. If the government were winning the war, there might be
less reason for the court to "endorse an aggressive and zealous
use of civil forfeiture"' by the government; under that scenar-
io, the perceived need for aggressive forfeiture tactics would
not be so great, and the court could then exercise its own au-
thority to restrict the government's forfeiture power without
subjecting itself to criticism for restricting the government's
ability to fight the war on drugs. But no one argues that the
government is winning. Alternatively, if civil forfeiture had
been shown to be ineffective, it might explain a change in the
court's civil forfeiture cases from routine acceptance to critical
examination of the process. No one appears to suggest, howev-
er, that civil forfeiture has no effect; indeed, the government
continues to champion the cause of civil forfeiture, and its use
of that process continues to increase.5
82 See generally Pratt & Petersen, supra note 1.
Judge Pratt was the author of the opinions in United States v. Lasanta, 978
F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1992), Unites States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts,
Inc., 971 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1992) and Onwubiko v. United States, 969 F.2d 1392
(2d Cir. 1992).
" Pratt & Petersen, supra note 1, at 47-48.
In 1992, the government filed 5083 civil forfeiture cases. See United States
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One noticeable change was the media coverage of forfei-
ture. Typical of this coverage was what has been referred to as
an "influential" six-day series on civil forfeiture in the Pitts-
burgh Press from August 11-16, 1991, entitled Presumed
Guilty: The Law's Victims in the War on Drugs.86 The series
presented an impressive number of forfeiture "horror stories,"
in which innocent property owners were depicted as victims of
the overzealous and self-interested enforcement of the civil
forfeiture laws by federal and state authorities. Although me-
dia attention of the government's abuse of the forfeiture laws
and the imbalance and unfairness built into the civil forfeiture
process had begun before 1991, it had become much more com-
mon and frequent by 1991.
Notwithstanding this negative coverage, the government
seemed unable to control its forfeiture litigation. It appeared
almost willing to oblige forfeiture critics, as its civil forfeiture
efforts provided plenty of examples of serious abuse. 7 More-
over, as noted above, law enforcement's financial self-interest
in maximizing civil forfeiture revenue was further fuel for
criticism." In some instances, decisions as to the allocation of
law enforcement resources appeared to be made more to maxi-
mize revenue than reduce crime.89 The former head of the
v. $30,440 in United States Currency, 2 F.3d 328 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing EXEcu-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR 1992 (1992) (Table 20)).
'o See Civil Forfeiture, supra note 39, ch. 151, at 552.
8 See, e.g., United States v. 110 Collier Drive, 793 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ala.
1992); Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin., 819 F. Supp. 698 (M.D.
Tenn. 1993). The Jones incident, in which the DEA seized all of the cash in Mr.
Jones' possession after receiving a report that a black man had purchased an
airplane ticket with cash, was widely featured in news stories and congressional
hearings well before the district court published its decision in 1993.
See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
83 Support for this criticism was provided by a Justice Department memoran-
dum to all United States Attorneys' Offices in 1990 that advised as follows:
We must significantly increase production to reach our budget tar-
get .... Failure to achieve the $470 million projection would expose the
Department's forfeiture program to criticism and undermine confidence in
our budget projections. Every effort must be made to increase forfeiture
income during the remaining three months of [fiscal year] 1990.
Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Memorandum, 38 U.S.
ATTORN. BULL. 180 (Aug. 15, 1990), quoted in Gary M. Malveal, The Unemployed
Criminal Alternative in the Civil War of Drug Forfeitures, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
35, 49-50 (1992).
The impact of this revenue-generating view of forfeiture on courts' treatment
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Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Office, Michael Zeldin,
speaking at an ABA conference, essentially acknowledged that
the government failed to control adequately its forfeiture ef-
forts:
The intelligent thing to have done would have been to pick your
cases carefully and not overreach. We had a situation in which the
desire to deposit money into the asset forfeiture funds became the
reason for being of forfeiture, eclipsing in certain measure the desire
to effect fair enforcement of the laws as a matter of pure law en-
forcement objectives.'
The impact of the media coverage was demonstrated in
1992 when Congressional hearings were scheduled on reform-
ing the forfeiture laws.s' When the hearings were held, they
become a further public forum for exposing civil forfeiture
abuses.92 The impact of the media exposure of forfeiture abuse
was also demonstrated when a Republican member of the
House of Representatives, supported by numerous co-sponsors,
introduced legislation that would have made significant chang-
es in civil forfeiture law favorable to claimants.93
Did the media coverage have anything to do with the
change in the Second Circuit's forfeiture decisions? After all,
the change in the court's opinions mirrored, both in time and
attitude, the perceived change in the public's attitude toward
forfeiture which was caused by the media coverage-that is,
from a near universal acceptance of civil forfeiture as an im-
portant weapon in the war on drugs to increasing concern that
it was being abused by law enforcement. Arguably, the public's
change in attitude probably made it more acceptable for the
court to criticize the government's forfeiture efforts and to
appear to reign in the government to some degree. Article III
of the government's forfeiture powers was illustrated when Justice Kennedy quoted
this same memorandum in his majority opinion in United States v. Good, No. 92-
1180, 1993 WL 505539 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1993), as a justification for providing greater
procedural protections for claimants.
' See Civil Forfeiture, supra note 39.
" See Current Reports, 7 Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) 300 (June 23, 1993) (inter-
view of George Fishman, legislative counsel to Representative Henry Hyde, sponsor
of proposed legislation to reform civil forfeiture).
'2 See Civil Forfeiture, supra note 39, ch. 151, at 554-56.
'3 See Civil Forfeiture, supra note 39, ch. 151, at 554 (noting Representative
Henry Hyde's (R. - ILL.) sponsorship of The Civil Forfeiture Act of 1993, H.R.
2417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)).
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judges, however, need not concern themselves with what is
publicly acceptable. Moreover, that the change in public atti-
tude may have affected the court's civil forfeiture jurisprudence
does not explain why the court did not rely on the precedent
and approach it had followed in earlier years.
Members of the court, as members of the public at large,
may well have begun to share with the rest of the informed
public concern about the government's possible abuse of the
civil forfeiture laws. But if the members of the court felt a
compelling need to express those concerns in their institutional
roles, they could have done so through dicta without substan-
tively changing the law. Thus, while concern with the possible
abuse of the forfeiture laws may explain the change in the
dicta found in the court's opinions (from statements endorsing
civil forfeiture94 to statements expressing concern that the
law was being abused),95 such concern fails to explain sub-
stantive changes in the law.
The change can best be explained by the Second Circuit's
need to legitimize itself and its institutional role as a separate
branch of government. For the court to do nothing in the face
of increased public concern about the government's abuse of
civil forfeiture law, and the unfairness of the civil forfeiture
process generally, would be to jeopardize its institutional legiti-
macy and power. The public expects its courts to act to curb
executive abuses of power. Judicial action in such circumstanc-
es is intrinsic to an "independent-but-equal" division of govern-
mental responsibility among different branches. Given the
public concern and attention that had developed, if the court
were to do nothing when confronted with specific instances of
government overreaching in the execution of forfeiture laws, it
would render its role superfluous." Judges establish or pro-
, See, e.g., United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989).
See, e.g., United States v. All Assets of Stat~wide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d
896, 903-04 (2d Cir. 1992).
" All independent power possessed by the judicial branch depends upon public
support for its institutional role. As Otto Kirchheimer has explained, courts cannot
direct public opinion or force changes in society because they have no independent
means by which to enforce their rulings. See OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUS-
TICE 3-21 (1961). But neither can they ignore public opinion or social change.
Courts need to respond to public concerns because a failure to do so implies that
judges are not fulfilling their institutional role and, therefore, will lose power by
attrition. Judicial decisions establishing or protecting the rights of claimants are
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tect legal principles that benefit unpopular litigants when they
perceive that the failure to do so would mean that they were
no longer fulfilling their institutional role. Being true to one's
institutional identity and, thereby, maintaining one's institu-
tional power, explains judicial lawmaking under such circum-
stances far more frequently than does intrinsic allegiance to
pure principles of law or individual rights. It also best explains
the change in the Second Circuit's forfeiture opinions in 1992
from earlier years.97
B. Is Legitimation Cynical?
To suggest that courts' decisions are motivated or ex-
plained by legitimation-that is, by judges' self-interest in
affirming and preserving institutional power-might be
thought of as cynical. The suggestion is only cynical, however,
if it is interpreted to mean that a court's decisions should not
be so motivated. One could argue that a court's decisions
should not be shaped by its self-interest in maintaining power.
But even accepting that cases will not be decided strictly ac-
cording to neutral principles of law, there are considerations
other than the court's own self-interest that one might argue
should inform court's decisions. Nevertheless, there is nothing
intrinsically wrong with a court's decisions being motivated by
legitimation.98 Under our government structure, courts are
not motivated by sympathy for the individuals who most often benefit from those
decisions-.narcotics offenders and criminal defendants generally-but by the courts'
concern with maintaining and legitimizing their own power.
" This analysis explains not only the change in the forfeiture decisions of the
Second Circuit in 1992, but the even more remarkable substantive changes in the
forfeiture decisions of the United States Supreme Court in its 1992 term and, to
date, in its 1993 term. In each of its three forfeiture decisions in the 1992 term,
the Court not only ruled against the government, but did so in a manner that
seriously restricts the government's forfeiture powers, both procedurally and sub-
stantively. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (deciding that the
Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause applies to an in rem civil forfeiture);
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (extending the scope
of the innocent owner exception beyond bona fide purchasers); Republic Nat'l
Bank of Miami v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992) (holding that jurisdiction
over an in rem forfeiture action is not divested when possession is discontinued).
Similarly, the Court's most recent forfeiture decision, United States v. Good, No.
92-1180, 1993 WL 505539 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1993), worked a major change in forfei-
ture law by holding that the due process clause ordinarily prohibits ex parte, pre-
notice seizure of real property.
" Legitimation in this sense implies limitations. While courts will act to estab-
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supposed to curb abuses of power by other branches of govern-
ment and to protect the rights of individuals. To maintain
their legitimacy, then, courts must perform those functions.
The "true" reasons a court might have for making particular
decisions do not detract from the value of the outcomes.
Acceptance of legitimation, therefore, is based on the as-
sumption that even though a court's decisions may be motivat-
ed by self-interest in preserving institutional power, its deci-
sions will necessarily accomplish the intended institutional
result-curb government abuse of power and establish and
protect individual rights. If legitimation is the reason a court
rules in favor of individual rights, but without concern for
whether those rights will be enforced, the court can appropri-
ately be criticized. In that instance, the court is attempting to
maintain power without meeting its institutional obligation.
The Second Circuit's forfeiture jurisprudence raises such con-
cerns.
While the Second Circuit's forfeiture decisions in 1992
certainly endorse expanded rights of claimants and exhibit
concern that the forfeiture process be conducted fairly, serious
questions remain as to whether the court's decisions will
achieve those objectives. For example, while the court in State-
wide found that the pre-notice seizure violated due process, it
ultimately ruled that the error was harmless because the at-
torney for the claimants had failed to make a showing that
constitutionally adequate notice would have resulted in a dif-
ferent outcome.9 The court seemed to criticize the quality of
the attorney's performance, without recognizing that the
claimants' choice of counsel, or the ability of their attorney to
perform adequately, may well have been compromised by the
government's seizure of all of their assets."' Similarly, while
lish and protect individual rights, they will do so only when it is politically safe.
That does not mean that a court's decisions simply reflect the will of the majority,
but rather that a court must ensure that the public will understand its decisions
to be a function of its institutional role and respect them for that reason. This
restraint prevents courts from occupying as important a role in the progressive
development of our society as some would advocate is appropriate. Nevertheless,
legitimation allows, and indeed requires, that courts recognize and protect individ-
ual rights and prevent or remedy abuse of pover by the other branches of govern-
ment. To expect much more from courts is probably unrealistic.
971 F.2d at 905-06.
'' Id. at 899 (court quotes from attorney's papers and affidavit with five "[sic]"
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the court ruled in Whaler's Cove that the Eighth Amendment's
cruel and unusual punishment provision and the Fifth Amend-
ment double jeopardy clause could apply to civil forfeiture
proceedings, it ultimately concluded that the claimants had not
made an adequate case for a violation of either provision.'
A critical factor in assessing whether the Second Circuit's
recent decisions represent a commitment to a positive view of
legitimation is the position the court would take on whether a
civil claimant should have a right to counsel. If the court is
committed to legitimizing its power in the civil forfeiture are-
na, the court should be willing to recognize a right to counsel
and, equally important, take the steps necessary to see that
the right, once recognized, is enforced. As claimants gain addi-
tional substantive and procedural rights by judicial decision
and legislation, the need for counsel increases. If the Second
Circuit's recent forfeiture decisions are to benefit claimants, it
is necessary that claimants be represented by counsel.
IV. A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR CLAIMANTS
When civil forfeiture cases were based primarily on trans-
portation or exchange theories (i.e., allegations that a vehicle
or vessel had been used to transport contraband or that prop-
erty was obtained in exchange for contraband), counsel was
less important. Transportation or exchange forfeitures are
generally not factually or legally complex. However, the expan-
sion of the law to permit forfeiture of property that "facilitated"
a crime or was "involved in" a crime, as well as the expansion
to allow forfeiture of real property and intangible property
rights, has made the assistance of counsel important because
of the legal and factual complexity of such forfeitures. The
expanded reach of forfeiture under these theories also increas-
es the likelihood that innocent owners, and others with legally
valid claims, will face forfeiture of their property interests. To
ensure that the claims of such persons are correctly adjudicat-
ed, the claimants need the assistance of counsel.
notations).
101 954 F.2d 29, 38-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
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A. The Importance of Counsel
Only a few years ago, a suggestion that a court might find
a constitutional right to counsel for civil forfeiture claimants
would probably not have been taken seriously. Because of the
potential for government abuse described above, however, the
idea no longer seems improbable. Indeed, a bill introduced in
Congress in 1993 to reform the federal civil forfeiture process,
sponsored by Republican Representative Henry Hyde, would
establish a right to counsel for claimants in civil forfeiture
proceedings who are unable to afford an attorney. °2 The pro-
posed legislation recognizes what anyone who has attempted to
litigate a civil forfeiture case already knows-without a lawyer,
claimants have very little chance of success, regardless of the
merits their claims. Even if an unrepresented claimant were
able to file the notice of claim within the required time period,
post the required cost bond, learn that the procedural aspects
of the case will be governed by the Supplemental Rules of Civil
Procedure and find the Supplemental Rules, the claimant
would then confront having to master federal civil litigation.
Add to that the task of comprehending substantive civil forfei-
ture law-which is probably changing more rapidly than any
other area of federal law, and the need to take into account the
potential effect of the forfeiture proceedings on any related
criminal investigation or prosecution, there is an obvious im-
balance that results.10
3
The imbalance caused by the lack of counsel is emphasized
further by the advantages possessed by opposing coun-
... See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also Civil Forfeiture, supra
note 39, ch. 151, at 554.
"G3 Courts have long recognized that in criminal cases, enforcement of a
defendant's rights depends upon the assistance of counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932). The same is true in civil forfeiture proceedings. Without an attor-
ney, claimants often will be unable to learn what their rights are, much less avail
themselves of or protect those rights in litigation. As one court recently noted,
"filing a claim in a forfeiture case is procedurally and, sometimes, conceptually
complex." United States v. 1604 Oceola, Wichita Falls, Texas, 803 F. Supp. 1194,
1199 (N.D. Tex. 1992). This truism is illustrated well by even a cursory reading of
Jeep Wrangler, where the claimant had to overcome substantial procedural barriers
before his claim was heard. 972 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1992). If the claimant had not
been represented by an attorney, it is doubtful that his claim would have ever
been considered on the merits. Id. at 473. The claimant was represented by an
attorney from the American Civil Liberties Union.
1993]
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sel--Justice Department lawyers who have considerable re-
sources at their disposal and whose -specialty is civil forfeiture
litigation. When encountering government counsel, the unrep-
resented civil forfeiture litigant also lacks an important protec-
tion afforded criminal defendants; while the prosecutor in a
criminal case has an obligation to see that "justice" is done, it
is unclear whether any similar obligation restrains the conduct
of government lawyers in civil forfeiture cases. Accordingly, to
remedy the imbalance and ensure fair treatment of all forfei-
ture claimants, courts should recognize a right to counsel.
There are a number of sources of law, both statutory and con-
stitutional, that potentially could provide a basis for providing
counsel to indigent civil forfeiture claimants.
B. The Possible Sources for a Right to Counsel
1. Statutory Authority
One statutory provision that can be used to appoint coun-
sel to civil forfeiture claimants is 28 U.S.C. section 1915(d)." 4
In at least one reported instance, the Second Circuit has di-
rected that counsel be appointed to a civil forfeiture claimant
under section 1915(d). In United States v. Onwubiko, the court,
in remanding the case for a trial, directed that the district
court appoint counsel for the claimant."0 5 Under section
1915(d), which provides district judges with authority to ap-
point counsel in civil cases, a court must consider a variety of
factors in determining whether to do so.1"6 Before considering
those factors, however, the court must "first determine wheth-
er the indigent's position seems likely to be of substance.""7
This requirement potentially turns the appointment provision
of section 1915(d) into a "catch 22:" a claimant with a "position
of substance" may need the help of an attorney to articulate to
.04 Section 1915(d) provides as follows: "The court may request an attorney to
represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if
the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or
malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
10 969 F.2d 1392, 1399 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Hodge v. Colon, 802 F.2d 58, 61
(2d Cir. 1986)).
16 Hodge, 802 F.2d at 56.
107 Id.
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the court that his or her position has substance. Further, even
if this first hurdle is overcome, the additional factors to be
considered are sufficiently subjective that a district court has
virtually unreviewable discretion in deciding whether or not to
appoint counsel under section 1915. In addition, there are
counter-incentives to a district court appointing counsel in a
civil forfeiture case; while appointing counsel may make the
process more fair, the efforts of the attorney may result in the
case becoming time-consuming and more difficult for the dis-
trict court to resolve.
Section 1915 has an additional drawback; while it provides
for the appointment of counsel, it does not provide for payment
of counsel. Although a civil forfeiture claimant represented by
a private attorney who is not getting paid may receive ade-
quate representation, the pool of lawyers who are both willing
and sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable to litigate a
civil forfeiture case without pay is, one suspects, quite small.
Thus, while section 1915(d) may provide a basis for assigning
counsel on an occasional basis to a deserving civil forfeiture
claimant, it is not a realistic source for ensuring that civil
forfeiture claimants in need of counsel are provided with ade-
quate representation on a regular and continuing basis.
A second possible statutory source that might serve as a
means for providing counsel is the Criminal Justice Act ("the
Act").1"' The Act provides for appointment of counsel to indi-
gent persons in federal criminal cases and "ancillary matters
appropriate to the proceedings.""9 At least one district court
has expressed the view that civil forfeiture proceedings are
included within the "ancillary matters" provision of the
Act.1 Even under this reading of "ancillary matters," howev-
er, the Act can not provide a means for making counsel avail-
able for civil forfeiture claimants on a regular and ongoing
basis because counsel would only be available to civil forfeiture
claimants who, as criminal defendants, already have appointed
counsel under the Act. While that describes some civil forfei-
ture claimants, it by no means includes all of them. In fact, to
"' Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
'' 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a),(c).




rely on the Criminal Justice Act would create an undesirable
result: those persons who are arguably most deserving or most
in need of counsel-persons who have not been charged with
any crime but face the loss of their property-would be pre-
cluded from obtaining appointed counsel. As a result, statutory
authority for the assignment of counsel seems insufficient to
provide claimants with counsel on a consistent basis.
2. Constitutional Authority
There is also a constitutional source of authority for pro-
viding counsel to civil forfeiture claimants, the Due Process
Clause."' In Lassiter v. United States Department of Social
Services," the Supreme Court explained that historically,
due process only required appointment of counsel in criminal
cases where the defendant, if convicted, faced loss of liber-
ty." While this history supports a presumption that due pro-
cess will ordinarily only require appointment of counsel for
persons facing a loss of liberty, that presumption is not irre-
buttable. The Court has recognized that there may be a judi-
cial proceeding other than one involving potential loss of liber-
ty where due process would require that an indigent party be
appointed counsel."' Furthermore, the presumption against
appointment of counsel must be balanced against the three-
part due process analysis the Court propounded in Mathews v.
Eldridge."5 Under the Mathews analysis, in determining
whether a claimant should be appointed counsel, a court would
consider: (1) the private interest at stake in the proceeding; (2)
the risk of error without counsel, and the probable value of
avoiding error by providing counsel; and (3) the government's
... Given the Supreme Court's willingness to recognize that in some circum-
stances a civil forfeiture may constitute "punishment," it may be possible to con-
struct an argument that a right to counsel exists under the sixth amendment,
notwithstanding its textual limitation to criminal cases. See Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2805 n.4 (1993) ("[Plrotections associated with criminal
cases may apply to a civil forfeiture proceeding if it is so punitive that the pro-
ceeding must be considered criminal.").
1 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
Id. at 25.
"1 Id. at 27, 31.
'. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 31; United States v. 1604
Oceola, Wichita Falls, Texas, 803 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
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interest, including any burden that would result from provid-
ing the claimant with counsel."6 The Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Good"' provides strong support
for applying the Mathews analysis to civil forfeiture proceed-
ings, and helpful guidance in doing so, especially in identifying
the different interests.
The suggestion that a court should conclude that civil
forfeiture claimants have a right to appointed counsel as a
matter of due process under Mathews v. Eldridge must address
the impact of Lassiter-if an indigent person does not have a
due process right to counsel in a suit for the custody of his or
her child, how could an indigent person have a due process
right to counsel to prevent forfeiture of his or her property.
There are two reasons which, taken together, provide an an-
swer.
First, a critical distinction exists between the two situa-
tions; in the child custody context, the government has not
caused the person to be indigent, whereas in the civil forfeiture
context, the person has been made indigent by the
government's seizure of his or her assets. Any due process
analysis of a civil forfeiture claimant's right to counsel should
take into account the fact that the government (the opposing
party) has caused the claimant to be unable to retain counsel.
Since due process governs the "balance of forces" in the adver-
sary system,"' the fact that it is the government that has
caused the claimant's indigency is an appropriate consider-
ation. Indeed, to rule otherwise would provide the government
with an incentive to seize all of a person's property so that
they will be unable to obtain counsel." 9
Second, application of the Mathews factors in the context
of a forfeiture proceeding will consistently yield a different con-
clusion than in the context of a child custody proceeding. The
"' Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
1,7 No. 92-1180, 1993 WL 505539 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1993).
.. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
.. Some might find this distinction objectionable because, when viewed ex ante,
it implies that a person who is not indigent has a right to counsel whereas a
person who was already indigent does not. While such a principle would be objec-
tionable as a theoretical proposition, the reality is that in the forfeiture context it




second factor, the risk of error, is significantly greater in the
forfeiture context not only because of the complexity of the law,
but, more importantly, because of the principles being adjudi-
cated and the role of the presiding court. In the child custody
context, the court will assume an active and important role in
determining the effect of its decision on the welfare of the
child. A forfeiture proceeding, on the other hand, resembles
more closely a purely adversarial proceeding in which the
court's role is limited to providing guidance to a jury's decision
or, even in a non-jury forfeiture proceeding, to deciding which
party has met its burden of proof.
These same reasons affect application of the third factor,
the government's interest in seeing that counsel be provided to
the litigants. In the child custody context, the government may
actually desire that the proceeding be less adversarial, given
the nature of the decision to be made and the role of the court
in making that decision. In contrast, in the civil forfeiture
context, there would appear to be no legitimate government
interest weighing against the appointment of counsel for civil
forfeiture claimants. 121 While there may be financial expendi-
tures that the government would incur in compensating ap-
pointed counsel and, perhaps, in providing an administrative
structure for the appointment process, given the enormous
revenue the government receives from forfeitures, these bur-
dens are insignificant.' 2' As a district court judge in Texas
observed in determining whether due process required appoint-
ment of counsel to two indigent civil forfeiture claimants,
"[p]erhaps the substantial imposition upon the government
would be requiring the Plaintiff to oppose an attorney in a
complicated and abstruse field where the Plaintiff normally
expects to meet only pro-se litigants struggling through the
120 In its decision in Good, the Supreme Court made it plain that the govern-
ment interest is to be measured with respect to the particular procedural safe-
guard at issue, and not on government's general interest in forfeiture. See United
States v. Good, No. 92-1180, 1993 WL 505539, at *8 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1993) ("The
governmental interest we consider here is not some general interest in forfeiting
property but the specific interest in seizing real property before forfeiture hear-
ings.").
121 For example, in an eight-month period during 1989, the forfeitures obtained
by the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York to-
taled $37,000,000, an amount that was four times the budget of the office during
that period of time. See Pratt & Petersen, supra note 1, at 671.
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claimant process."'
A further question raised by the right to counsel sugges-
tion might be whether the court of appeals should rule that a
civil forfeiture claimant has a right to counsel under Mathews.
Because a district court already has the authority to rely on
the due process analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge to appoint
counsel, and because that determination can perhaps best be
made on a case-by-case basis, one can ask whether it is neces-
sary or appropriate for a court of appeals to issue a ruling that
merely affirms those principles. Although any given district
court could utilize the due process analysis of Mathews v.
Eldridge to appoint counsel to a civil forfeiture claimant, that
should not preclude a circuit court from holding in an appropri-
ate case that civil forfeiture claimants have a due process right
to counsel. Moreover, while the determination of a right to
counsel under the due process analysis of Mathews is ordinari-
ly to be made on a case-by-case basis, a circuit court could
provide important guidance as to the general application of the
Mathews factors in the context of civil forfeiture proceedings.
That is especially true given that application of the third factor
(the government interest in not providing counsel) will consis-
tently and strongly weigh in favor of providing a claimant with
counsel, as will the second factor (risk of error), except in those
cases where the outcome is foreordained.
123
It would be appropriate, then, for a circuit court to hold
that whether or not counsel is required in civil forfeiture cases
essentially turns on an assessment of the first two factors, the
private interest at stake and the risk of an erroneous adjudica-
tion without counsel. It would also be appropriate for a circuit
court to indicate that, given the complexity of the civil forfei-
ture process, the risk of error will be significant, unless the
case is so one-sided that the correct result is obvious. Similar-
" United States v. 1604 Oceola, Wichita Falls, Texas, 803 F. Supp. 1194, 1197
(N.D. Tex. 1992).
" Given the uniformity that the weighing of the applicable factor is likely to
produce in the civil forfeiture context, as opposed to the child custody context, a
case can be made that an appellate court could or should address the issue in a
manner that its decision would be applicable to civil forfeiture cases generally.
See, e.g., United States v. Good, No. 92-1180, 1993 WL 505539 (U.S. Dec. 13,
1993) (prohibiting pre-notice seizures in all civil forfeiture cases involving real




ly, while the interest of the claimant at stake will obviously
vary from one case to the next, a circuit court could provide
important guidance by indicating that this factor is to be eval-
uated according to the value of the property to the individual
claimant, rather than by the objective dollar value of the prop-
erty sought to be forfeited.124 In sum, a circuit court could
provide that in a civil forfeiture case, due process will ordinari-
ly require appointment of counsel except where the value of
the property at stake is not significant to the particular claim-
ant, or where the case for or against forfeiture is so strong that
the risk an error would occur without counsel is insignifi-
cant. 2 '
CONCLUSION
The dramatic change in the Second Circuit's forfeiture
jurisprudence reflected by the decisions discussed in this Arti-
cle might be explained by the court's attempt to legitimize its
institutional role and its power. The true test of this hypothe-
sis is whether the court is prepared to recognize and enforce a
right to counsel for civil forfeiture claimants. For the court's
recent forfeiture decisions to have their full impact, claimants
must be represented by counsel. If the court is committed to
seeing that these decisions do, in fact, provide the procedural
and substantive fairness in the civil forfeiture process they
promise, the court should explicitly affirm that claimants have
a due process right to counsel. The Eldridge analysis, conscien-
tiously and carefully applied, is an appropriate method for
deciding whether the government should be required to provide
a civil forfeiture claimant with counsel.
It would take a court that is both bold in its thinking and
confident in its judgment to acknowledge explicitly a due pro-
cess right to counsel for civil forfeiture claimants, and to estab-
lish general guidance for the application of that right. Based
124 This principle is necessary to insure that a claimant's right to counsel is not
dependent on the dollar value of the property that the government seeks to seize.
Of course, where a claimant has other property, not subject to possible forfeiture,
which provides the claimant with the financial ability to obtain counsel, then the
right to counsel would not obtain.
" See 1604 Oceola, 803 F. Supp. at 1197.
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on its recent forfeiture decisions, there is no court better suited
to take that step than the Second Circuit.
Art Rogers, "Puppies"
© 1980 Art Rogers-Point Reyes
Jeff Koons, "String of Puppies," 1988, Polychromed wood,
42 x 62 x 31 ins.
@ 1988 Jeff Koons
